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The Evolving Framework of the
United States Export Control System:
A Case Study in Exporting Fiber Optic Telecommunications Systems
to the Former Soviet Union
By Linda M. Googins

n response to the dramatic changes in the politie3I
systems of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. the United States is being forced to reconsider
the purposes and procedures of its export control
policy. American businesses, eager to be the first to enter
new commercial markets, have lobbied hard to reduce the
number of items controlled and licenses required to export
goods to these countries. There remain, however, national
security concerns that the political changes may not be
permanent and the existence of large nuclear arsenals continue to pose a military threat to the West. In refonnulating
its export control policy, the United States must attempt to
balance these competing concerns so as to encourage the
development ofnew democracies and market economies and,
at the same time, preserve the goals of national security.
This article will discuss first the current United States'
export control system, specifically as it applies to the export
of"dual use" items) to the former Soviet Union. Second, the
role ofinternational cooperation in restricting exports will be
examined, focusing on the effectiveness ofCoCom. 2 Finally,
this article will examine, as a "case study," the exportation
of fiber optic telecommunications systems to Russia. This
particular issue has intensified the debate over export control
policy, dividing those wishing to support the new democracies with exports of high technology against those desiring to
protect United States security interests.

I

The Export Administration Act is a broad grant of
power to the President, directing him to take action to further
stated congressional goals. The President, in turn, has
delegated this power to the executive agencies under the
direction of cabinet secretaries. The Bureau of Export
Administration ("BXA'') ofthe Department ofCommerce is
the principal operating unit for administering and enforcing
the EAA. 7 The substantive regulations applicable to exporters have been promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce in
the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR'').!

B. Why Control Exports?
Under the Export Administration Act, there are three
stated purposes for controlling exports: to protect national
security, to further foreign policy goals, and to protect the
domestic economy from a drain of goods in short supply.9
For reasons of national security, the government regulates
the export of items which are deemed important to the
strategic and military capabilities of"controlled countries. "10
Controlled countries consist primarily of communist countries, i.e., the People's Republic of China, countries within
the territory formerly controlled by the Soviet Union, and the
former Warsaw Pact allies. In comparison, foreign policy
controls are not necessarily directed only at "controlled
countries." They are either additional or parallel controls,
which are implemented for the purpose of fulfilling U.S.
foreign policy objectives.))
National security controls, directed at limiting other
I. The Export Control System
countries' access to strategic items, need to be maintained on
A. Legal Authority for Export Controls
The legal authority for government control over ex- a multilateral basis in order to beeffective.)2 Incomparison,
ports ofgoods, technology or software from the United States foreign policy controls allow the United States to protest or
derives from the Commerce Clause of the United States support actions of foreign governments and have been
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to regulate effectively maintained on a unilateral basis. However, recent
commerce with foreign nations. 3 Congress, in an exercise of political developments in "controlled countries," combined
this power, has enacted several statutes relating to exports. 4 With an increasing number of foreign nations capable of
Of these acts of legislation, the Export Administration Act producing "strategic items" have challenged the multilateral
of 1979 ("EAA''), as amended,s is the most important to framework that the United States has historically used to
American exporters. The EAA provides the Clrganizational implement its national security controls.
Breakdowns in the multilateral framework of enforcestructure for the control system, and also authorizes the
6
ment directly affect the ability of American companies to
export controls for dual use items.

compete on an international level. American businesses identified by an "Export Control Classification Number"
desiring to export to formerly communist countries, there- ("ECCN'').23 The general characteristics of the item will
fore, are most concerned with relaxing the number of items guide the exporter, to the appropriate commodity group.
and countries controlled for national security reasons. Thus, Then, the particular characteristics and function ofthe item
it is necessary to discuss the scope of controls, which items should be matched to a specific ECCN. Ifthe export is a high
are controlled and what licenses are required for export.
technology item, it is likely to be subject to national security
controls, and, therefore, will require an application for an
C. Scope of Export Controls
"Individual Validated License. ''24 It is important to note that
Under the Export Administration Act, all commodi- the Commerce Department imposes the task of making the
ties, technology, and software are subject to control by the correct classification determination on the exporter.
Commerce Department whenever they are exported from the
Second, for each ECCN the CCL indicates the counUnited States or re-exported by a U.S. or foreign person from try groups to which validated licenses are required and the
any foreign country to another foreign country.13 Foreign statutory basis for control. For national security control
origin items generally become subject to such control when purposes, foreign countries are separated into seven country
they enter the United States and are re-exported. 14 Canada groups designated by the symbols Q, S, T, V, W, Y, andZ.2S
is excepted from most, but not all, U.S. export controls, but The former U.S.S.R., the Baltic states, Albania, Bulgaria
has no special exceptions from re-export controls.ls
and Mongolia are included in Country Group Y.26 CzechoThe Commerce Department has the responsibility for slovakia, Poland, and Hungary are in Country Group W.27
classifying items whose export is considered particularly These groups represent the "controlled countries" that have
sensitive and listing those items on the "Commerce Control been identified as targets of national security controls in
List" ("CCL'1'6 The CCL
accordance with the EAA.28
does not include items under
Thus, even if an item
the exclusive jurisdiction ofanis not a high technology item.
otherU.S.agency.t' The major
it may be subject to licensing
exception is for items of an
because of the country of
"inherently military nature, "18
destination. The national
which are subject to the Arms
security licensing policy for
Export
Control
Act
these destinations is one of
("AECA"). 19 Under the
approval if the Bureau of
AECA, the Department of
Export Administration deState, Office of Defense Trade
termines that the export is
Controls20 maintains the "Mufor a civilian use or would
nitions Control List" and isotherwise not be detrimental
sues export licenses for items on that list. 21
to United States security.29 In addition, exports to these
Because the CCL covers dual use items, i.e., those countries of CoCom30 controlled commodities (represented
which can be used for both military and civilian purposes, by an ECCN with suffix "A'') require review and approval
distinguishing between the two agencies' licensing control in CoCom, unless they are covered by a "likely to be
can be difficult. Thus, in order to get a proper export license, approved" or "favorable consideration" notation in the
an exporter must first determine which government agency ECCN which, respectively, indicates that they are licensable
has jurisdiction. Although some changes have been made to at national discretion or licensable after notice to CoCom if
alleviate this burden on American businesses, an exporter no objection is raised within a specified time period.
should still consult both the Commerce and State departFinally, the exporter should check the list of "banned
ments' regulations, the EAR and ITAR respectively, as end-users," representing those companies which have been
regards to the types of items controlled by each agency. 22
found guilty of past violations ofthe EAA, or are considered
by the government to be unreliable in safeguarding exports
D. Export Licensing Requirements
against re-export. 31 The exporter also is required to report
After determining agency jurisdiction, an exporter any potential end-use of which he or she knows would be in
conducts a preliminary assessment of export licensing re- violation of the export regulations. 32 Such impermissible
quirements, taking into consideration the nature of the item, end-uses would include terrorist activities or projects involvthe country of destination, and the end-user or known end- ing weapons of mass destruction.
use. First, the nature of the commodity is taken into
If all three of the above considerations are met, then
consideration when referring to the CCL to determine if an the item may be shipped under a "General License. "33
item is subject to any export controls. Entries on the CCL are General licenses are licenses established by EAR provisions

UAmerican businesses . ..
have lobbied hard to reduce
the number of items controlled and licenses required
to export goods . ... "

for which no application is required and for which no
document is nonnally issued. 34 The conditions for the use of
these licenses are set out in 15 C.F.R. Part 771 for commodities and Part 779 for technology and software. Most nonstrategic items may be exported under a general license.
In all other cases, an "Individual Validated License"
is required for export. 35 An individual validated license is a
document issued by the Bureau of Export Administration in
response to an application filed by an exporter that authorizes a specific export from the United States. These licenses
may be subject to interagency review. 36 There are also
"Special Licenses," which are essentially multiple validated
licenses for projects, distribution or service supply contracts. 3?

published. However, the control lists of participating governments are based on the CoCom lists, and the regulations
of many participants, including the United States, incorporate virtually the complete text of Industrial List entries.
Thus, the United States "Commerce Control List" is based
substantially upon the CoCom Core List, and the U.S.
"Munitions List" is based substantially upon the CoCom
Munitions List.

B. Effect of Co Com Prior to 1990
Efforts by the United States and her allies to increase
the effectiveness of the CoCom system led to a series ofhighlevel meetings among the CoCom partners, culminating in a
January 1988 meeting at Versailles. The meeting affirmed as
a basic principle of CoCom that each country has the
II. International Cooperation in Restricting Exports
responsibility to ensure effective enforcement of CoComA. CoCom: Its Role and Function 38
agreed controls on its exports.
Since World War II, United States strategic export
Consistent with the January 1988 commitment to
controls have operated largely within the framework of a increase the effectiveness of controls while shortening the
multilateral arrangement with U.S. allies. In 1949, near the control list, a CoCom working group developed a "common
beginning of the Cold War, the Coordination Committee for standard" with respect to licensing and enforcement. This
Multilateral Controls ("CoCom") was established to coor- common standard was endorsed by CoCom as guidance to
dinate the restrictions on the export of scarce or strategic enable all member governments to achieve any needed conitems to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic ofChina and trol program improvements. The common standard repretheir allies. The participants of CoCom consist of the sented agreed minimum elements that must be present for an
representatives of NATO, less Iceland, plus Japan and effective control system.
Australia.
CoCom confidentiality cloaks the details of the comCoCom is not based on a treaty or other formal mon standard. The major elements, however, are assumed to
international agreement. The procedures and deliberations include: (1) licensing requirements (e.g., control list, regulaof CoCom are confidential. The Committee operates under tions, industry awareness), (2) documentation (license applia rule unanimity. Thus, anyone member holds veto power cation, import certificate/end use statement, technical supover the other members. Measures informally agreed to in port documentation), (3) enforcement, and (4) cooperation.
CoCom must be implemented by laws or regulations of the
participating governments before they acquire legal effect.
C. Changes in CoCom Since 1990
The dramatic changes in superpower relationships
The national security controls under the EAA are almost
always the result of multilateral determinations made within combined with the fact that there are fewer and fewer "sole
CoCom. CoCom's function in the United States export source"countries for commercially exchanged goods and
licensing process, however, is not set forth explicitly in the know-how has caused some commentators to question the
EAR.
continuing relevance of CoCom. 39 This questioning of
The basic functions of CoCom in support of control- CoCom's effectiveness comes as the countries of Eastern
ling strategic exports are: (1) to achieve agreement on Europe and the former Soviet Union are viewed more as new
strategic criteria for controls, (2) to formulate detailed lists commercial markets than as a military threat.
of embargoed commodities and technical data, and (3) to
In June 1990 CoCom conducted a High-Level Meeting
("HLM")
to discuss the liberalization ofexport controls.
coordinate efforts to achieve effective enforcement of the
embargo. CoCom also reviews the export by CoCom CoCom agreed to a "special procedure" for exporting to
members of specific proposed shipments to controlled coun- Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, removing them from
tries. Members exchange views on export control enforce- the "controlled" category and allowing them to receive
ment standards, but CoCom itself has no enforcement pow- exports of western high-technology.40 Political developments and development of the capacity and commitment to
ers of its owo.
In addition, CoCom periodically reviews and updates safeguard sensitive exports are the considerations for remova CoCom Atomic Energy List, Munitions List, and Core ing a country from controlled status.
In addition, it was agreed to redraft the CoCorn
List. The Core List, formerly the Industrial List, includes
dual use goods and technology which are not included on one Industrial List. Starting with a blank slate, technical experts
of the other lists. The CoCom lists are not officially determined which items were necessary to maintain the

West's existing strategic advantage in high-technology over
that of the former Soviet Union. A new "Core List"
approved by CoCom in May 1991, greatly reduced multilateral East-West controls.41 The "Commerce Control List"
was restructured in September 1991.42 This was done to
follow the structure of the newly agreed to "Core List."
In 1990, the United States and other members of
CoCom approved nearly 1600 export licenses for shipments
of high-technology goods to the Soviet Union worth about
$1.7 billion, including high-speed computers to be used to
improve the safety of Soviet nuclear power plants. 43 This
marked the third consecutive rise in exports, and a dramatic
increase over approved exports worth nearly $250 million in
1987.44
III. A Case Study: Exporting Telecommunications
Systems to Russia .
A. Introduction
The telephone system in the former Soviet Union grew
out of a collection of regional networks using copper wires,
built under Stalin in the 1930's. Unlike Eastern Europe, the
territory of the former Soviet Union does not have a reasonable pre-World War II infrastructure on which to build new
communications links. 45 Today, making inter-regional or
inter city calls is problematic and it is almost impossible for
a caller from the West to reach someone in one ofthe former
Soviet republics. 46
In the next century, telecommunications could do for
Russia what the railroad did for the United States 200 years
ago. Fiber optic cables, introduced in the United States in the
early 1980's, are lines capable of carrying huge amounts of
digital data across long distances. Fiber optic technology
revolutionized the way American companies do business. In
addition to its many civilian uses, fiber optic cables are also
acknowledged to have important military uses. Defense and
intelligence agencies hold fiber optics responsible for the
high-technology advantage the West holds over the East.
In 1986, the Soviet Union formed the Svetovod Research Institute to develop fiber optic technology. 47 After
three years it achieved virtually nothing, clearly demonstrating the effectiveness of CoCom' s export restrictions on fiber
optic technology and the Soviet Union's dependence on the
West for high-technology goods and know-how. Other
options for modernizing communications are not as viable as
fiber optics. Digitizing, an upgrade of the lines without new
fiber optic cables, would be time consuming.48 Mobile
communications and satellite operations are not capable of
fully covering the vast territory of Russia. Thus, fundamental to the future development of Russia and the former
Republics of the Soviet Union is the improvement of telecommunications and the installation of fiber optic cables.
Until recently, the United States and her allies, acting
through CoCom, have maintained tight restrictions on the
export of high-technology to communist countries. How-

ever, the remarkable changes in the political structure ofthe
Soviet Union over the past year persuaded the members of
CoCom to redraft their export control policy. At the center
of the debate over reducing the types ofcontrolled items was
fiber optic technology, an item useful for both commercial
and military applications. This debate highlighted the vastly
different positions that the United States Government took
against the European Allies and American industry in viewing the West's role in assisting the former Soviet Union to
make the transition from communism to democracy.
B. Reasons/or Change 1989-1990
After taking control of the Soviet Union in 1985,
Mikhail Gorbachev oversaw the drastic political reforms of
Eastern Europe and by 1991, the breakup of the Soviet
Union. As early as 1988, Western policy makers were
willing to reconsider their export control policies in order to
assist the formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe
make the transition to democracy and free markets. 49 By
1989, the European members of CoCom were anxious to
liberalize exports, but expressed frustration at the perceived
reluctance of the United States, which advocated a more
gradual change for security reasons.
Responding to the concerns of U.S. allies, President
Bush ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("JCSj to conduct
a study on dual use export controls and reevaluate the
strategic threat posed by the U.S.S.R. On February 14,
1990, CoCom held a two day meeting in Paris to begin a
review of rules in the first move towards relaxing parts ofthe
40 year old system of curbs on the sale of high tech goods to
Warsaw Pact countries. In May of 1990, the White House
released a statement on the conclusion ofthe JCS report that
a complete overhaul of the list was warranted. so The allies
were somewhat surprised, but, nevertheless, encouraged by
the position of the United States.

C. Agreement to Liberalize Export Controls
Following up on its February meeting, CoCom held
aHigh-Level Meeting in Paris on June 6-7, 1990. The United
States put forth several proposals intended to preserve the
system of CoCom while making it more flexible. The
proposals were widely accepted and agreement was reached
on drastically streamlining the current "Industrial List" of
controlled dual use products. 51 At the conclusion of the
HLM, agreement was reached on a liberalization program
which would:
(I) replace the current list of controlled items, the
Industrial List, with a "Core List" of key technologies and goods to be drawn up from scratch, i.e., a
blank slate;

(2) delete 1/3 of the Industrial List entries;

(3) decontrol certain priority sectors, e.g., computers, machine tools and telecommunications;

(4) develop special procedures for countries representing a lesser strategic threat; and
(5) renew the commitment to the "common stan-

dard" level of effective protection. 52
Technical experts were given until December 1990 to draft
the new "Core List" of restricted exports. American industry voiced its approval ofthe position and leadership that the
United States Government showed towards relaxing export
controls and opening potentially huge commercial markets.
The enthusiasm of the telecommunications industry, however, was cut short when the Department of Commerce
blocked a plan by a consortium led by the American telecommunications company U.S. West to lay a fiber optic link
across the entire length of the Soviet Union.
D. Dispute Over Fiber Optics
Despite intense industry lobbying efforts, the United
States announced on February 14, 1991, that restrictions on
exports of fiber optic equipment to the Soviet Union would
continue until the domestic situation "settles into a more
predictable and promising pattern. "53 Then Deputy National Security Adviser RobertM. Gates, speaking before the
Electronics Industries Association, stated that "[w]e simply

must hold the line on approvals to ship [technology and
goods] that could dramatically enhance Soviet strategic
capabilities. '>$4
At the end of February, the United States and her allies
decided to postpone the second CoCom HLM, originally
scheduled for December 1990 to approve the draft "Core
List," because of continuing differences over trade in telecommunications equipment and related technology. 55 The
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom failed to
resolve their differences with a group of other countries, led
by France and Germany, over the export of fiber optic
telecommunications equipment to the Soviet Union. 56 These
countries protested the United States' proposal to limit fiber
optic sales to equipment capable of transmitting data at 45
megabits per second or less, because they claimed that this
equipment was no longer produced in the West. 57
The HLM was finally held on May 23, 1991. At a oneday meeting held in Paris, the United States and her allies
reached agreement on a new "Core List," scheduled to take
effect on September 1991.58 The Core List brought about a
50 percent reduction in the existing controls, in addition to the
33 percent reduction agreed to by CoCom in June 1990, for
a total reduction of 83 percent. 59
United States industry again expressed its disappointment. 60 Although pleased with progress on avionics, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and machine tools,
industry spokespersons expressed disappointment at the lack
of progress made on telecommunications and computers.61
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NSA's position was significantly strengthened by the Persian Gulf War. Although the United States' military was
able to deactivate most ofIraq's telecommunication system
during that war, they were unable to knock out the country's
fiber optic network, which helped President Saddam Hussein
maintain links with his military commanders in the south. It
is acknowledged that, in times of war, the only way to take
out a fiber optic system is to drop a bomb and sever the
cable. 70
Still, the National Association of Manufacturers
(''NAM'') expressed its grave concern over the lack of
progress in telecommunications negotiations. "Of particuE. The Final Breakup of the Soviet Union
On August 19, 1991, an attempted coup by communist lar concern to American industry is the apparent working
hardliners failed to oust Gorbachev from government. This assumption of the United States Government that there is no
surprising tum ofevents appeared to justify the United States feasible distinction to be made between civil and military
reluctance to approve high-technology exports of a military uses for telecommunications equipment," said aNAM paper
significance to the U.S.S.R. A delay in the relaxation of sent to the Department of Commerce at the beginning of
export controls was expected in the wake of the Soviet 1991. 71 "We firmly reject the contention that any moderncrisis. 64 The final Core List, however, was published as ization of the Soviet public telephone network [through the
use of fiber optics equipment]
scheduled on September 1, 1991,
poses a threat to U.S. national
and the necessary member country
security because of an asregulations effectively put the list
into action.6s
sumed benefit to Soviet military communications. ''72
The failed coup precipitated
the breakup ofthe Soviet Union and
Pressured by Congress,
in September of 1991 the Baltic
American businesses and European allies, the Bush Adrepublics finally regained their inministration began to rethink
dependence. With the new Core
export control curbs on the
List in place and the break up of the
sale of advanced telecommuSoviet Union a reality, American
nications equipment, computbusinesses were anxious to enter
ers and space satellites to the
these new commercial markets.
Soviet Union. At the end of
American industry representatives
1991, Gorbachev agreed to
were concerned that U.S. businesses
were losing a competitive advantage to their overseas coun- step down from the leadership of the Soviet Union, and the
terparts, especially Germany and France, whose govern- Russian flag was raised over the Kremlin. With the Soviet
ments were actively supporting investment in the Soviet Union dissolving into fragments of the old republics, some in
Union. 66
the defense/intelligence community changed their position,
On September 25, 1991 the Congressional Subcom- arguing that it may be better for the Soviet Union's military
mittee on International Economic Policy and Trade heard high command to have better communication to prevent
testimony on allowing the sale offiber optic technology to the misuse of nuclear weapons by breakaway republics. 73
Soviets. 67 The United States Government continued to argue
F. A Loophole Found and Exploited
that exporting high-speed fiber optic equipment to the Soviet
A significant event in the debate over exports of fiber
Union would enable the Soviet military to compromise U.S.
intelligence gathering operations. 68 An important issue for optics occurred in November 1991. A German manufacthe government was the fate of non-public networks - fre- turer, Carl Zeiss Jena, sold high-speed fiber optic cable to the
quencies still occupied by the military and a key factor in Soviet Union using a loophole in Western trade restrictions. 74
mobile networks. 69
The company, located in what used to be East Germany, sold
The National Security Agency ("NSA") led the oppo- more than 600 miles of fiber optic cable to Moscow, taking
sition within the United States Government against relaxing advantage of an exemption in the trade regulations for
controls on high-tech telecommunications equipment. The Eastern European manufacturers that had done business
agency, which gathers intelligence primarily through elec- with the Soviet Union in the past. The United States sent a
tronic interception, argued that the Soviet military could use team to investigate Carl Zeiss Jena and the sale to the Soviet
fiber optic networks to avoid interception of traffic. The Union. If the cable was actually produced on the territory of
The Bush Administration responded that the new "Core
List" now contained "only the most critical goods and
technologies that are essential in maintaining the existing
significant gaps between Western and Soviet based military
systems. "62 The government also pointed out that the May
24th agreement would enable the Soviet Union to upgrade its
telephone system to the standard of the United States in the
early 1980's.63 This would include phones that work,
cellular equipment, and facsimile machines - a significant
improvement over the current state of affairs.

"The United States
sent a team to investigate Carl Zeiss Jena
and the sale to the
Soviet Union. "

fonner East Germany, then the CoCom restrictions would
not apply. The United States team was to investigate whether
a mere transfer had been made. 7S
At the same time, the United States began intensive
consultations with her allies on plans to eventually ease longstanding restrictions on high tech exports to the republics of
thefonner Soviet Union. 76 On February 7, 1992, at a CoCom
working group meeting, three European countries, Germany,
Netherlands, and Italy, proposed that the members drop
virtually all restrictions on exporting civilian telecommunications gear. Eight other European nations supported the
proposal. 77 The United States withheld its support, presumably awaiting a report from its investigation ofthe Carl Zeiss
Jena sale.
Finally, on March 6,1992, the United States reached
a tentative agreement with Europe and Japan to loosen
international controls on exports of advanced telecommunications equipment. The products covered by the agreement
included high-quality fiber optic cables. 78 Despite prior
concerns of the intelligence and defense communities, the
United States decided to strengthen the economies of the
fonner Soviet republics and to lay a foundation for American
business activity there.
IV. Conclusion
The political changes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union were swift and dramatic. Remaining in place, however, was an export control system designed to withhold
critical western technology from the communist countries in
order to protect national security interests. European allies
and American businesses were the first to advocate a relaxation in high-technology exports. While obviously anxious
to take advantage of new commercial markets, they effectively argued that the technology was necessary if the formerly communist countries were to make a successful transition to democracy and free market economies.
Fiber optic telecommunications equipment became the
focus of the debate over international cooperation in export
controls. Because the nature ofthe technology made it useful
for both civilian and military applications, the United States
Government at first adamantly opposed the exportation of
fiber optic technology. Beginning in the fall of 1991,
however, a strong lobbying effort from American industry
and pressure from European allies caused the United States
to rethink its position. The final "straw" appeared to be the
sale of a fiber optic cable from a German company to the
Soviet Union. Realizing that American companies had the
most to gain from allowing sales of fiber optic technology,
the United States made a basic shift in policy in March of
1992. As this case demonstrates, any effective liberalization
of export controls in the future hinges on the concept of
differentiation, whereby export controls will be decided on a
country-by-country basis, balancing the benefit of the technology against real concerns for national security.

Endnotes
I"Dual use" items are those which have civil uses but which can
readily be utilized in military applications, or are deemed to have
strategic significance. The term "items" is used to refer to all that

is subject to export control, which includes equipment, materials,
software and technology.
2"CoCom" stands for the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. It is the framework in which the United
States cooperates with other nations in order to effectively enforce
export controls for national security reasons.
'U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4'fhe most important statutes affecting exports include the following: Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,50 U.S.C. app. §§ 144. implemented in Foreign Assets Control Regulations
("FACR"), 31 C.F.R 500-30 (maintained by the Department of
Treaswy, Office of Foreign Assets Control, controlling certain
exports to, and financial transactions with. named countries);
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 ("AECA"), 22 U.S.C. §§
2751-96. implemented in International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"), 22 C.F.R 120-130 (maintained by the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Control. regulating the
export of defense articles and services "inherently military in
character"); Export Administration Act of 1979 ("EAA"). 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420, implemented in Export AdministrationRegulations ("EAR"), 15 C.F.R 768-99 (maintained by the
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration,
providing the organizational structure for the export control
system and controlling the export of "dual use" items).
'50 U.S. C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1988 & Supp. I 1989, Supp. IT 1990,
Supp. ill 1991). The EAA of 1979 was amended in 1981, Pub.
L. 97-145,95 Stat. 1727 (Dec. 29,1981), extensively amended in
1985 by the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985.
Pub. L. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (July 12. 1985), and by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Pub. L. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (Aug. 23, 1988).
6Id

7Exec. Order No. 12214.3 C.F.R 256 (1981), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. app. § 2403 note (1988).
815 C.F.R 768-99 (1991).
950 U.S.C. app. § 2402 ("Congressional declarntion ofpolicy").
1°50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (authorizing the President to
impose national security export controls "to restrict the export of
goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other . . . countries which
would prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States").
1150 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(B) ("to further significantly the
foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared
international obligations").
For example. items integral to the production of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons. missile technology, or aiding
in terrorist activities have been deemed by the United States to be
important to control either unilaterally or in co-operation with
other countries for reasons offoreign policy.
1250 U.S.C. app. § 2404(i) (in recognition of the effectiveness of
multilateral controls for national security, this section authorizes
the President to enter into negotiations with the other governments to accomplish uniform enforcement measures).
1350 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(national security controls -authority).
1450 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(5)(A).

IS50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b).
and Slovak Federal Rfplblic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia \\Wld be
1615 C.FR 799 ("Conuoodi1y Control List and Related Matters").
nm:wed soon ftom the internationally approved list of a>unIries now
1'15 CPR § 799.1(a).
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